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AMENDING THE OVERSIGHT: LEGISLATIVE·
DRAFTING AND· THE CABLE ACT
MICHAEL

I.

MEYERSON·

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable
Act") I heralded a new age for the law and regulation of cable
television. The Cable Act represented· the first comprehensive
federal law governing the no-longer new ·com·munications technology of cable television. After years of confronting a "patchwork" of federal, state; arid local regulation, the cable industry,
government regulators, and the public were told that the Cable
Act would create a "natiomil policy concerning cable communications,"2 and firmly "establish guidelines for the exercise of
Federal, State, and local authority."3
/
Unfortunately, the Cable Act has failed to fulfill its numerous
objectives. Advertised as a careful balance, the Cable Act has
been administratively and judicially converted to a lopsided grant
of victory to the cable industry. ProClaimed a harbinger of clarity: the Cable Act has led to frequent litigation over· the meaning
of its most basic terms.
This result is due to a perhaps not unusual combination of
legislative factors. First, despite the elongated negotiation process, the final version of the bill was hurried through the end of
long congressional term. Second, Congress entrusted the Fed. eral Communi~ations Commission ("FCC" or "the Commission") to carry out its mandate of compromise, only to have both
the FCC and the reviewing courts igriore the language and spirit
of the Cable Act. 4 Finally, in constructing the delicate balance of
the Cable Act, the legislative drafters listened to too few voices.
The primary negotiators were representatives of the cable industry and the cities; no other input was permitted until the bill was
in almost final form, and numerous gaps in the law were permit-

a

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. B.A. Hampshire College,
1976; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1979.
I Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-'549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. V 1987». Since the legislative history and
proposed amendments use the numbering of sections from the original law as passed,
this Article will also use that numbering in the text. Footnotes will provide both section
numbers.
2 Cable Act, § 601(1), 47 U.S.C. § 521(1).
3 Id. at § 601(3), 47 U.S.C. at § 521(3):
4 See infra text accompanying notes 70-93.
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ted to remain. 5
There have "been extensive congressional discussions over
the flaws of the Cable Act. 6 Due to this "legislative oversight,"
substantial amendment is likely. While basic policy issues, such
as the continuance of rate deregulation and the problems of vertiql integration, have occupied most of the discussions of the
Cable Act, many areas of cable policy have received only scant
attention. This Article examines some of the important, yet generally overlooked, problems created by the Cable Act. The Article also proposes amendments to permit the Cable Act to fulfill
its original lofty promise.
I. AMBIGUITY AND OTHER DISEASES OF LANGUAGE' .
All legislation starts with the serious drawback of being composed of words. The inability of language to create certainty of
understanding is a long-acknowledged reality: "A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used."8 And as Justice Felix Frankfurter explained, this difficulty in interpretation is
many times greater for complex statutes, "If individual words are
inexact symbols with shifting variables, their configuration can
hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured definiteness .... A
statute is an instrument .of government partaking of its practical
purposes but also its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward
and groping efforts."9
The Cable Act, however, has more than its fair share of
"awkward and groping efforts." Needless confusion has been
created by the failure to define fundamental terms. Avoidable
litigation has been caused by other definitions that speak with
more ambiguity than clarity. Still other critical areas of the Cable
Act are permeated by unelucidating sounds of silence.
One of the cardinal rules of legislative drafting is to never
use the same word to convey more than one concept. Repeating
" See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
See Oversight oj Cable TV Hearings before the Subcomm. on Communications oj the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and TrallSportation, S. Hrg. 101-464 IOIth Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) [hereinafter Oversight oj Cable TV]; Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights oj the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary , S.Hrg. 100-818, 100th Congo 2d Sess. (1989).
7 See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 4353 (1975) [hereinafter THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES].
R Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes,J.).
!I Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading oj Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528
(1947).
·6
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a word to express different meanings, so-called ,"utraquistic subterfuge,"IO will inevitably lead to confusion by violating the logical presumption that, within a single statute or document,· the
same word, will refer to the same idea.
The Cable Act manages to use the word "service" (or "services") to convey at least four mutually exclusive thoughts. For
example, the Cable Act requires certain cable operators to provide channels for the commercial use of unaffiliated parties, II and
has provisions to prevent cable operators from circumventing
this requirement. Section 612(c)(3) states that these channels,
"shall not be used to provide a cable service ... if the provision
of such programming is intended to avoid the purpose of this
section." The "services" in this subsection unmistakably mean
"programming." 12
The Cable Act defines "cable service," though, more
broadly, as "the one-way transmission of ... video programming, or ... other programming service, and ... subscriber interaction, if any, ... required for the selection of such video
programming or other programming service."I!! This definition
of "cable service" was meant to draw the boundary between that
which could not be governed by common carrier regulation and
"non-cable services" whose regulation the Cable Act was not
designed to preempt. 14 Accordingly, "cable services" includes
not only video programming, but pay-per-view, the one-way
transmission of computer games, and one-way videotext. 15 Noncable services include shopping and banking at home, electronic
mail, and video-conferencing. 16
The distinction between "services" meaning only video programming and "cable service" meaning video programming and
the provision of one-way information technology was ignored by
the FCC in its proceedings on rate deregulation. The Cable Act
specified that such deregulation was to occur except where the
FCC found that a "cable system [was] not subject to effective
10 R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAITING 62 (1954) [hereinafler LEGISLATIVE
DRAITING].
I I For a discussion of thee failure of section 612 to create a workable system for leased
access, see infra text accompanying notes 112·19.
12 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE,
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4684 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT 934] (referring to "increase in the sources of programming").
13 Cable Act, §§ 602(5)(A), (5)(8),47 U.S.C. §§ 522(5)(A), (5)(8).
14 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 41·42.
15 [d. at 44.
16 [d.

236

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

. [Vol. 8:233

competition."17 In its rulemaking, the FCC quoted the directive
from the House Report: "In determining whether [a] cable system is subject to effective competition ... the FCC should consi!1er the number and nature of services provided, compared with the
number and nature of services available from alternative sources
and, if so, at what price."18 In defining "effective competition,"
the Commission only" considered competition for video programming, but not other forms of "il1formation services." Perhaps
that analysis is that which Congress intended. Perhaps alllegislative thought on rate-making concerned rates charged for video
programming. If so, more precise language should have been
used in ·the ·legislation ..
A still different definition of "services" must be discerned
for section 625(e), which explicitly bars the ope"rator from obtaining court-ordered .modification of "any requirement for services relating to· public,' 'educational, or governmental access."19
"Services" cannot possibly mean "programming" for this provision because the cable operator does not supply' programming
for public, educational or governmental access. In fact, the cable
operator is statutorily prohibited froIl1 exercising any editorial
control over the programming that is shown on the access channels. 20 Thus, there cannot be any requirement imposed on the
cable operator for programming "relating to pllblic, educational,
or governmental access."
.
Although the .phrase "access services" is not defined in the
Cable Act, it may be possible to define "access services" by ascertaining what those services do not include. The section on modification does refer to 'access . requirements other than "access
services." The cable operator is permitted to obtain modification
of "facilities or equipment, including public, educati9.nal, or governmental access facilities or equipment, "21 upon proof of commercial impracticability .. This provision, unfortunately, merely
further c~mfuses the reader. A perusal of the Cable Act reveals
17 Cable Act, § 623(b)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(I). For a discussion of the FCC's decision making process re'garding this standard, see infra notes 87-93 and accompanying
text.
I H Implementing the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 49 Fed. Reg.
48,765,48,770 (1985) (quoting HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 66).
'
I!l Cable Act, § 625(e) (emphasis added), 47 U.S.C. § 545(e) (emphasis added).
20 Cable Act, § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e).
21 Cable Act, § 625(a)(I)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 545(a)(I)(A). "Facilities or equipment"
seems to refer primarily to hardware and physical structure. "Commercial impracticability" is given the same meaning as in the Uniform Cpmmercial Code. See HOUSE REPORT
934, supra note 12, at 71 (referring to u.C.C. § 2.-615 comment 8 (1978)).
.

"

..
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not only that "services" does not always mean "s'ervices," but
that "facilities" are only a subset of "facilities."
In a fascinating, though far 'from unique, example of selfreference, "the, definitional section of the Cable Act actually defines "public, educational, or governmental access facilities" to
mean both "channel capacity designated for [access}" and facilities and
equipment for'the use 'of such channel capacity."22 Thus, when
speaking of access, '''facilities and equipment" means "facilities"
minus "channel capacity."23 Though it 'may seem gratuitous, it
should probably be pointed out that the phrase that is defined in
the "Definitions" section, "public, educational, or governmental
access facilities;" does not appear by itself anywhere in the Cable
Act except in the definitional section - only the subterm "access
facilities or equipment" appears.
Because (1) "access fa~ilities and equipment"does not include "channel capacity," and (2) the only, referenc~ to access
other than .to "facilities and equipment" in tl:Ie modification section is to access "services," it may be assumed that (3) "services"
in this subsection encompasses 'the channel capacity set aside for
access. To the rather obvious question of why the term "channel
capacity" was not used, it could be argued that "services" was
meant to also include all other non-hardware requirements such
as staffing, 'promotion; and funding of access centers. 24
A final meaning for "service" can be found in section
626(c)(I)(B), permitting denial of franchise renewal for "the
quality of the opera~or'sservice." "Service" here seems to encompass notions of "consumer protection."25 The Cable Act
states that "operator's service" means "signal quality, response
to consumer complaints, and billing practices" but not "cable
22 Cable Act. § 602(13). 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (emphasis added). There also appears
to be no significance between the conjunctive "facilities and equipment" used in the
definitional section and disjunctive "facilities or equipment" used in the modification
section. The House Report. in describing the modification section. utilizes the conjunctive phrase as well: "[T]he cable operator may obtain modification of a requirement for
facilities and equipment . . . . " HOUSE REPORT 934. supra note 12. at 71 (emphasis
added).
.' ,
23 Apparently. this statutory distinction was not appreciated by those who wrote the
House Report. since. in a discussion of the facilities and equipment that could be required,in a franchise., it is stated that "[f]acility and equipment requirements may include requirements which relate to channel capacity .... " HOUSE REPORT 934. supra
note 12. at 68.
"
'24 See Meyerson. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires. 19 GA. L. REV. 543. 578 (1985).
25 See Cable Act § 632. 47 U.S.C. § 552. which is titled "Consumer protection" and
refers to enforcement of "customer service requirements." [d. at § 623(I)(a). 47 U.S.C.
§,543(1)(a).
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services. "26
There is absolutely no excuse for requiring those trying to
understand a statute to work so hard to ascertain different meanings for the same word. Such confusion should be avoided
through amending the language of the Cable Act. The word
"services" should be used to mean programming or information
provided to subscribers over the cable system. To describe videotext, on-line airline guides and the like, the term "information
services," used in section 624(b)(I),27 should replace the phrase
"programming service" that was used in the definitional section
602(5). When programming - video, audio or both - is meant,
that word should be used. For the prohibition on modification of
access "services," the phrase "channel capacity, funding and
other requirements for access other than facilities and equipment" should be substituted. For the renewal section, "customer
service" could be used instead of "operator's service."
The ambiguity of the word "service" leads to another area of
confusion. The Cable Act preempts local regulation of "rates for
the provision of cable service."28 The Cable Act does not define,
however, the words "rates" and "provision." If "cable service"
is video and other programming, plus the interaction "required"
for the selection of the programming,29 what about other aspects
of cable technology? One court ruled that, despite rate deregulation, a state may prohibit a cable operator from charging subscribers who live in sparsely populated rural areas an additional
fee for "contributions in aid of construction."30 This ruling was
based on the concern that charging different subscribers different fees would conflict with Congress's "emphasis on encouraging equal access to cable television."31
Courts have been divided over the ability of localities to regulate cable charges other than for programming. One court has
held that disconnect fees can be regulated. 32 Another court held
that fees for FM service, second cable outlets, and remote control
26 /d. at § 626(c)(I)(B), 47 U.S.C. § 546 (c)(I)(B). The Cable Act uses the term
"cable services" to mean programming. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
27 Cable Act, § 624,47 U.S.C. § 545 (prohibiting franchise requirements for specific
"video programming or other information services").
28 Id. at § 623(a).(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a),(b) (permitting deregulation if a cable system faces "effective competition").
29 Id. at § 602(5), § 522(5). See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
30 Housatonic Cable Vision. Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti I. Control, 622 F. Supp.
798 (D. Conn. 1985).
31 Id. at 811.
32 Comcast Cablevision of Sterling Heights, Inc. v. City of Sterling Heights, 178
Mich. App. 117, 443 N.W. 2d 440 (1989).
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devices are "rates" and thus protected from local regulation. 33
. Other questions arise. For example, in the Cable Act, there
is no. discussion of whether a city can regulate the rates for the
provision of "lock boxes," devices that permit individual subscribers to block out offensive programming. 34 Lock boxes playa
critical role in the regulation of cable television. They permit individual households to keep indecent programming off their sets,
without censorship and without preventing the viewing by those
who wish to see such programming. 35 It would be a legitimate
policy decision for a locality to decide that the costs of protecting
the sensitive, without harming the willing, viewer should be
shared by the entire community, not just those desiring the protection. This would be the economic effect of providing lock
boxes at no charge to all who request them. 36 Cities should be
permitted either to require the free distribution of lock boxes or
to regulate the price at which they are made available.
A revision of the Cable Act should specify that such regulation is permitted. For localities where rates have been deregulated, a logical distinction should be drawn into the legislation,
. one based on the premise that" only "effective competition" precludes the heed for regulation. Under traditional economic analysis, consumers in a competitive market will choose to purchase
cable service if they value the additional programming they can
receive at more than the monthly price they must pay.37 Cable
companies, according to this theory, will not charge exorbitant
prices when there are easy alternatives, and video and radio services should be deregulated in competitive markets. There is no
reason to believe, though, that secondary charges will be similarly controlled by market forces. Disconnect fees, for example,
will not figure in a consumer's initial purchasing decision. 38 Furthermore, as stated earlier, there may be policy reasons to price
lock boxes at below market prices. The revised Cable Act, if it
continues rate deregulation, should describe explicitly what
33 City of Dubuque v. Group W Cable, C 85-1046 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 25, 1987), reported
in KAGAN, CABLE TV L. RPTR., Mar. 11, 1987, at 5. See Rosenthal v. Sammons Communications, W85-0214(B) (S.D. Miss. May 8, 1986), reported in KAGAN, CABLE TV L. RPTR.,
June 13, 1987, at 8 (preemption of charges for wiring second television sets).
34 See Cable Act, § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2).
35 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 70.
36 The Cable Act only requires that the operator provide lock boxes to those who
request them. There is no requirement that they be affordable. Cable Act, § 624(d)(2),
47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2).
37 See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3-10 (2d ed. 1977).
38 This analysis is similar to why many courts do not enforce secondary clauses in
consumer form contracts. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 293-302 (1982).
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"rates" are deregulated and specify that the preemption of regulating "rates for the provision of cable service"39 only includes
video and other programming, plus the technology necessary for
the general reception of that programming. Thus, the converters
used by all subscribers would' be free from regulation, but other
charges not affected by "effective competition," such as lock
boxes, disconnect fees, or late fees, would be subject to city
reVIew.,
Other local regulation involving rates may further the effectiveness of the "competitive" market. A requirement that reasonable notice be given prior to a rate increase taking effect
would permit subscribers to make alternate arrangements for the
reception of video programming without paying the unbargained-for increase. 4o Franchising authorities should be authorized by the revised Cable Act to impose such advance notice
requirements.
Imprecise drafting has also permitted the FCC and various
courts to limit the ability of individuals to receive cable, even
when they are willing to pay the offered rate~ Thus, despite relatively clear congressional intent, provisions that require cable operators to wire all parts of a' community 'and that require
landlords to permit cable operators to offer service to tenants
'
have been unduly restricted.
The House Report states that the Cable Act, "[r]equires that
cable service be made available in all areas of a city .... "41 The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, though, declared that the Act, "manifestly does not require universal service. "42 The section of the 1984 Act in question states that "[i]n
awarding a franchise or franchises, a franchising authority shall
assure that access to cable service is not denied to any group of
potential residential cable subscribers because of the income of
the local area in which such group resides. "43
To determine the meaning of this language, the court
quoted from the House Report, which stated that "a franchising
authority in the franchisIng process shall require the wiring of all
areas of the franchise area to avoid this kind of practice [redlin39

Cable Act, § 623(a), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a).
One court has upheld a 90-day notice requirement. Comcast Cablevision of Sterling Heights, Inc. v. City of Sterling Heights, 178 Mich. App. 117, 443 N. W .2d. 440
(1989).
41 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 20.
42 ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988).
'
43 Cable Act, § 621 (a)(3) , 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(3).
40
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ing]."44 The court stated, "[W]e read the sentence to require exactly what it says: 'wiring of all areas of the franchise' to prevent
redlining."45 Therefore, the court concluded that if there was no
proof of redlining, wiring of a community could be limited. In
quoting the House Report, the court omitted the key introductory phrase indicating that the franchising authorities were required to act "in awarding a franchise or franchises,"46 in other
words in the franchising process itself. Thus, franchising authorities were required to "assure ... access"47 before there could be
any evidence of redlining. The obvious course of action was to
require universal service in the franchise process.
Moreover, the concept of universal service permeates the
regulation of electronic communication. In its allocation of television frequencies, the FCC has long had as its top priority the
provision of television service to every part of the country.48
Similarly, the FCC is statutorily required to protect, "the principle of universal telephone service, accessible to all segments of
the population regardless of income."49
The Cable Act should be clarified so that the principle of
universal service unmistakably applies to cable television as well.
All areas of a community should be wired and operators should
be barred from using facially neutral reasons to avoid low income
neighborhoods. The only exception should be those areas that
the franchising authority and operator agree are too remote for
economic wiring. 50
Consumers are also denied the opportunity to subscribe to
cable television if they are not home owners but merely tenants.
Many landlords sign an exclusive contract with a Satellite Master
Antennae System ("SMATV") and preclude the cable operator
from contracting with willing potential subscribers. 51 An earlier
draft of the Cable Act explicitly addressed this situation by re44

ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d at 1580.
Id. (emphasis in original)(quoting HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 59).
/d. at 1579 (quoting HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 59) (omitted id. at 1580).
47 /d. at 1560.
48 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (making broadcasting available "to all the people of the
United States").
49 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1120 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd,
464 U.S. 1013 (1983) . .
50 This was a statement made in a colloquy on the 1984 Act by prime House Sponsor, former Representative Wirth. 130 CONGo REC. HlO,44 1-42 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Wirth). Such debates are the "least reliable" means for determining
the proper interpretation of a statute. THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPl.lCATION OF STATUTES, supra note 7, at 156. Any such exception should be specified in the statutory language itself.
51 See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 82.
45
46
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quiring all owners of multi-unit residential buildings and mobile
home parks to permit cable operators to provide service to those
who desired it. 52 This provision was removed during the SenateHouse Conference on the bill, 53 but most of its provisions were
incorporated in a different section of the Cable Act and can be
read to imply that the right of tenants to receive cable is still in
force.
Section 621 (a)(2) permits any franchised cable operator to
use both public rights-of-way and. "easements ... which have
been dedicated for compatible uses. "54 The term easements includes private, as well as public, easements. 55 This section, as did
the earlier provision, provides that an operator may not adversely
affect the safety and appearance 'of the property and must pay for
any damages. The new section, however, omitted any reference
to landlords and mobile home park owners as well as any discussion of calculating "just compensation" for the taking. 56 To further confuse the courts, the discussion in the House Report on
the importance of tenant's access to cable and the Cable Act's
intent to provide such access were retained, even after the old
statutory section was removed. 57
Courts have been uncertain how to interpret the Cable Act's
mixed signals. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has concluded that the removal of this provision, in section 633, indicates that Congress did not intend for cable operators to have any federal right of access to private, multi-unit
dwellings. 58 Many other courts have disagreed and interpreted
the 1984 Act to grant operators access to premises of tenants and
condominium owners who want service. 59
52 H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT 934,
supra note 12,.at 114. Under this provision, landlords would have been permitted to
deny access to cable operators only if they made available "a diversity of information
sources and services equivalent to those offered by the [local] cable system." Id.
53 130 CONGo be. S 14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
54 Cable Act, § 621 (a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 54 1(a)(2).

55/d.
56 See, e.g., Loretto V. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(court discusses just compensation and taking).
57 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 36-37 and 79-83.
58 Cable Inv., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989). See Cable Assocs. V.
Town and Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989). One court
has argued that the reasoning of Woolley does not restrict cable operator access to easements in private residential communities, but should be read to mean only that the
Cable Act does not authorize operator access to the "interior of a multi-unit dwelling."
Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd., V. Property Owners Ass'n, 706 F. Supp. 422, 429 (D. Md.
1989) (emphasis in original).
.
59 See, e.g., Centel Cable Television CO. V. Admiral's Cove Assocs., 835 F.2d 1359
(11th Cir. 1988); Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Caravetta Enters. Inc., 682 F.
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A redraft of the Cable Act should face this i~sue directly. No
landlord should be able to come between a willing cable operator
and a willing potential subscriber. As Congress stated in 1984,
"There is simply no point in requiring diverse information
sources and services if a large segment of the population apartment dwellers - can be denied access to that information
by a landlord who, in effect, functions as an editor for his or her
tenants. "60 As long as the property owner is given the just compensation required by the Constitution,61 the tenant should receive the diversity of information services and sources promised
by the Cable Act.
A final issue that has bedeviled courts involves standing to
sue to enforce the Cable Act. Only a few of the Cable Act's substantive provisions, such as those for modification, renewal, privacy and unauthorized reception of programming, specify who
may enforce rights created by the Act. 62 Many other key provisions, though, are silent. 63
Courts have been forced to use the difficult test enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 64 to determine if there is a
private right of action to enforce these provisions. 6!i Courts have
split in determining whether cable operators may sue to enforce
their section 621 right to utilize easements that are "dedicated
for. compatible uses." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that cable operators could sue to obtain
access to the easements,66 but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit denied standing. 67 One court held that public access programmers had standing to enforce the section 611
ban on editorial control of access programming by a cable operaSupp. 1244 (D. Mass. 1985); Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enters., 633 F. Supp. 1315
(D. Del. 1986).
60 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 36.
61 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
62 Cable Act, §§ 625, 626, 631, 633, and 636; 47 U.S.C. §§ 545, M6, 551, 553, and
556.
63 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
64 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
65 The factors to be considered are: 1) Is the plaintiff a party whom Congress intended to benefit especially; 2) Does the legislative enforcement scheme imply congressional intent either for or against a private right of action; 3) Is private enforcement
consistent with the statute's purpose; and 4) Does the Cable Act create an issue of federallaw? /d. at 77-78.
66 Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., 835.F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.
1988). Similar holdings were issued in Cable Assocs. v. Town and Country Management
Corp., .709 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989) and Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd. v. Property
Owners Ass'n, 706 F. Supp. 422 (D. Md. 1989).
67 Continental Cablevision of Mich., Inc. v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 840 F.2d 16
(6th Cir. 1988). See Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 680 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd
on other grounds, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989).
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t6r,68 while a different court has ruled that viewers lack standing
to sue to enforce the leased access provisions of the Cable Act. 69
The Cable Act should be redrafted'to make clear that all who
are directly injured by a violation may sue to enforce the statutory protections. An over-extended city government may be incapable, reluctant' or uninterested in bringing litigation. Private
enforcement is needed to permit the parties most affected by a
violation to protect not only their own rights but the public right
to receive cable service and 'diverse access programming.
II. 'THE MORE THINGS CHANGE: THE IGNORED CONGRESSIONAL
ATIEMPT TO CONTROL THE FCC
One of the primary motivating factors for the passage of the
Cable Act was congressional concern over the path chosen by the
FCC. Under th~ 1934 Communications Act" the Commission's
authority to regulate cable had emanated from its power to regulate broadcasting. 70 Up until 1984, the Supreme Court had held
that the FCC's power over cable was limited ~o that which was
"reasonably ancillary" to the regulation of broadcasting. 7l , The
Court was, concerned that, because cable was not mentioned in
the 1934 Act, a reading of the FCC's power without reference, to
broadcasting would give the FCC "unbounded" jurisdiction. 72
OnJune 18, 1984, the Supreme Court upheld an FCC cable television regulation. without reference to the Commission's power
to regulate broadcasting. 73 TJIe Court held that the FCC had
"broad respon~ibilities," and thereby broad discretion, in the
regulation' of cable.
Concurrently, the FCC had embarked on anaggressive campaign to preempt qmch of the cable regulation at the local level.
The Commission preempted the regulation of the rates charged
for virtually al1c;able progrartmiing and permitted' a cable company which had contracted with a city to provide programming
68 Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Missouri, 723 F. Supp. 1347
'
(W.D. Mo. 1989).
69 New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 y. Supp.
802,813-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing sections 612(d), 532(d)). The court interpreted
the phrase "any 'person aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a cable operator to make
channel capacity available," to be limited to programmers, not, the potential viewing
public deprived of,su!=h programming. [d.
70 See 47 U.S'.C., § 152(a) (granting the FCC power to regulate "all interstate and
foreign communication by wire or radio").
71 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
72 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979).
.
73 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698 (1984) (upholding preemption of all state regulation of the "signals, carried by cable system operators").
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on the basic tier to retier such programming unllaterally.74 Another decision restricted the ability of cities to enforce commitment for the funding of public access faciiities. 75
.
Many in Congress were alarmed at the unrestra~ned power
oEthe FCC. In the words oEone legislator, "We must not' abdicate our responsibility and turn cable regulation over to the FCC
and the -Supreme C04rt."76 Significantly, even among those who
favored deregulation for cable television, the FCC was apparently nof held in high regard. 77 There is not a single word of
praise for the FCC in either the House Report or the floor debate
on the Cable Act. .
Accordingly, the Cable Act explicitly limited the role and discretion of the FCC in matters of cable policy. Most notably, section 3 of the Cable Act constricts the source of FCC authority:
"The provisions of this Act [the Communications Act of 1934]
shall apply with respect to cable service ... as provided in title VI
[entitled 'Cable Communications ']. "78 Thus, the FCC was denied the ability to use its open-ended "public interest" grant of
authority over broadcasting,79 but was limited to those duties
specified 'in the Cable Act.
..
'. . .
However, the FCC, continues to assert its former reg\llatory
power. In preempting local regulation of the technical standards
to be met bya cable operator, the FCC relied· not only on the
specific Cabl~ Act prov~sion on technical standards but on its preAct broad, amorphous power, "to r~gulate all aspects of interstate communication by wire or radio," and take "all regulatory
actions 'necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commis~
sian's statutory responsibilities.' "80
Though the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's preemption of
technical standard regulation, the Court expressly declined to
decide' whether the FCC continues to possess its~ pre~Act regulaa long footnote
tory
power. 8) In so declining, the Court included
.
t
74 See Community Cable TV, Inc., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 735 (1984), affg: 54 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 1351 (1983). Fora further discussion of related issues, see gene'rally Cox
Cable of New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 594 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. La. 1984),
vacated. without opinion, (E.D. La. Dec. 16, 1985).
I
•
75 City of Miami, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 458 (1984).
.
76 130 CoNG.REC. HIO,444 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Markey).
77 Even where the House Report endorsed federal preemption over certain areas,
disapproval of the FCC was apparent: "[Franchising authority] mll~t be based on certain
important. uniform Federal standards that are not continually altered by Federal, state or
local regulation." HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 24 (emphasis added).
78 47. U.S.C. § 3 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
79 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
80 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984).
81 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 70 n.6 (1988).
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presenting both sides' arguments as to the reach of the FCC's
power. First, the Court discussed the new language of section 3
that specifies that the FCC's power over cable is provided in the
Cable Act. 82 Then the Court presented the following reason
why, arguably, the FCC's power was undiminished: "On the
other hand, the House Report suggests that this language is
merely a more explicit grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the
Commission over specified aspects of cable service, see H.R.Rep.
No. 98-934, at 95-96 (1984), which settles matters that had occasionally been in dispute."83
The citation to the House Report is curious, since the actual
language does not seem to support a finding of broad FCC
power over cable television. The complete language from the
House Report quote states that the FCC's "exclusive jurisdiction" over cable is only "as provided in Title VI."84 It does not
imply that there is any other source of "exclusive jurisdiction"
over cable for the FCC. Moreover, on the cited page 96, the
House Report states that, "the addition of a new Title VI of the
Communications Act [the Cable Act], regarding c~ble services,
does not limit any jurisdiction the FCC may otherwise have over
other communications services provided over a cable system."85
Certainly, if Congress went out of its way to declare that the
Cable Act was not intended to limit FCC jurisdiction over "other
communications services provided over a cable system," it
strongly implies that the Cable Act does limit FCC jurisdiction
over cable services provided over a cable system.
A revision of the Cable Act should avoid the litigation that
will inevitably follow the Supreme Court's discussion, without
resolution, of this issue. New language should clarify Congress'
desire to rein in the FCC. The scope of the FCC's power would
be clearly, if redundantly, indicated by adding the word "only,"
so that section 152(a) read, "The provision of this Act shall apply
with respect to cable service ... only as provided in title VI."
Also troubling is the manner in which the FCC continues to
regulate as if the Congress had not altered its permissible regula[d.
[d. The Court also stated that section 303 of the Communications Act "continues
to give the Commission broad rulemaking power 'as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter,' 47 U.S.C. § 303(r), which includes the body of the Cable Act
as one of its subchapters." /d. This reference to the unamended section 303(r) is unpersuasive as the Cable Act'sjurisdictional provision could be easily interpreted as a specific
limitation on the broader power. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, supra note 10, at 101
(discussing implied amendment by inconsistent legislative action).
84 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 95.
85 [d. at 96 (emphasis added).
82

83
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tory (or more precisely, deregulatory) goals. The FCC demonstrated its stubborn refusal to accede to congressional dictates.
when it described the congressional purposes behind the Cable
Act as to "significantly deregulate the provision of cable service."86 This alleged single-minded congressional intent was discovered by the FCC through a combination of wishful thinking
and of carefully editing out all statements contrary to the Commission's "deregulation mania."87 The Commission stated that:
Foremost among these [congressional purposes] is the intent
of the statute to establish "standards which encourage the
growth and development of cable systems[,] . . . assure that
cable communications provide ... the widest possible diversity
of information sources and services to the public[,] ... " and
"[p]romote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulation that wOl,lld impose an undue economic burden on cable systems. "88
The complete statutory language, which the Commission only
partially quoted, reveals not a mandate for deregulation but an unmistakable congressional intent to balance the interests of both the
regulators and the regulated. The full language, with the words
omitted by the FCC italicized, expressed an intent to provide
franchising "standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to
the needs and interests of the local community";89 and "assure that cable
communications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public. "90
Perhaps it is clearer in hindsight, but the FCC should not have
been trusted to abandon its previous deregulatory goals and follow
the more complex mandate of the Cable Act. The result of what
one observer has termed the "unforseen actions" of the FCC,91 has
been a deregulation of cable rates in more than 97% of the nation's
cable systems,92 and the FCC's preemption of local requirements
for technical standards that exceed the minimum imposed by the
86 Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984,50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,650 n.69 (1985).
87 130 CONGo REC. HIO,444 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Markey).
88 Implementing the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 49
Fed. Reg. 48,765, 48,765-48,766 (1984).
89 Cable Act, § 601(2), (4),47 U.S.C. § 521(2), (4) (emphasis added).
90 [d.
91 Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 187 (statement of Mayor Sharpe James of
Newark, NJ.).
92 U.S. General Accounting Office, National Suroey of Cable Television Rates and Seroices 4
(1989).
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FCC during 1974. 93
In the future, the FCC should be denied discretion to determine the scope of appropriate preemption and deregulation. Congress, not the FCC, should define "effective competition" for rate
regulation and should permit local governments to supplement the
technical and quality standards that cable systems must meet. .

III.

To DRAFT CABLE LEGISLATION, CONGRESS MUST LISTEN TO
"THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DIVERSIlY OF INFORMATION'
SOURCES"94

The process by which the Cable Act was drafted guaranteed
a future of unending difficulty. Behind closed doors, two players,
the cities and the cable industry, hammered out a proposal that
both believed would protect their interests. Their agreement became the basis for the Cable Act. 95 Delegating the initial drafting
of the legislation to these two interested parties was probably essential in the political environment of the early 1980's if there
was to be any chance for enacting comprehensive legislation.
Unfortunately, the self-interests of these two groups did not include the interests of the rest of the universe affected by the legislation. More insidiously, there were certain issues for which the
negotiators were not adversaries but shared an interest, an interest at odds with that of the subscribing public. Obviously, any
revision of the Cable Act must take into account the views of all
those affected by the legislation. 96
Although the representatives of city government and cable
operators fought over the role that the cities should have in regulating cable, they shared a desire to preclude others from having
a significant role. To the operators, this would permit fewer parties to regulate; for the cities, it meant fewer limitations of their
discretion. Thus, the original draft of the Cable Act which was
agreed to by the cities and cable industry denied the public any
93 Report and Order in MM Docket No. 85-38, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,462 (1985), maintaining standards established in Report and Order in Docket No. 20,018, 49 F.C.C.2d 470, 47780 (1974). The 1985 preemption was upheld in City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57
(1988).
94 Cable Act, § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4).
95 See, e.g., 130 CONGo REc. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Goldwater) (describing negotiations between the cities and cable industry as basis for
cable legislation).
96 Congress seems to have learned this lesson. Among the speakers at congressional
hearings on cable legislation, aside froin the cities and the cable industry, are representatives from broadcasters, wireless cable operators, the telephone industry, public access
programmers and consumer groups. See Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at III.
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role in the renewal process. 97 The proceedings were to be only
for the benefit of the local government and the incumbent operator. It took a last minute amendment to provide that the public
be granted "appropriate notice" and "opportunity for comment"
o'n either an informal granting of renewal or during a hearing on
the cable company's performance under the franchise. 98
This limited grant of participation neither specifies the role
to be played by the public nor provides the public with an adequate role in' the renewal decision: The Cable Act should be
amended to permit the public tQ stop "sweetheart deals" for renewal between franchising authorities and cable operators. 99
The public should be permitted to require a public hearing on
the adequacy of the cable operator's performance under the existing franchise and request proposals for the renewed franchise.
This right could be enforceable either through individual request
or through the obtaining of signatures of a certain percentage of
the population. Second, any city granting renewal should be required to announce, in writing, the reasons for its decision. Finally, subscribers should be permitted to appeal any granting ofa
renewal if either proper procedures are not followed or the city's
published factual conclusions are "clearly erroneous" in light of
the information obtained at the hearing.
, A second area where the cities and cable industry lacked incentive to protect the public interest involves access to the cable
system for non-affiliated programmers. The Cable Act contains
provisions regarding both, "public access," the cablecasting of
programs at little, or no cost to the g~neral public, and "leased
ac'cess,"100 the leasing of channel time for commercial distribution of programming. Due to the failures of the Cable Act, public
access, h 4 s been unnecessarily hindered and leased access has
been a total, undeniable failure:
'Third-party access to the cable system was a critical part of
the balance struck by the Cable Act. In fact, one of the stated
purposes of the Cable Act was to "assure that cable communica97 See H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 626, reprinted in HOUSE REPORT 934, supra
note 12, 'at 110.
'
98 Cable Act, § 626 (a), (h), 47 U.S.C. § 546(a}, (h). This amendment was added on
the last day of congressional debate. 130 CONGo REC. SI4,281 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984)
(amendment of Sen. Goldwater).
99 This is not necessarily a frivolous fear. Virtually all franchises are renewed, with
only a few notable'ex~eptions. In 1984, it was reported that operators in New Vorl<. State
had been awarded renewal in all 370 of their attempts. Narrod, State Regulators See More
Work with Passage ofNew Cable Law, Multichannel News, Dec. 3, 1984, al: 33, col. l.
100 The Cable i\ct refers to "leased access" as "commercial use." Cable Act, § 612,
47 U.S.C. § 532.
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tions provide ... the widest possible diversity of information sources
and services to the public."lol The theory behind public access is
that the cable operator, the single electronic gatekeeper in a
community, should not monopolize the entire multi-channel capacity of a system constructed on the public rights-of-way. In
lieu of monopolization, "[public access channels] provide groups
and individuals who generally have not had access to the electronic media with the opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas."lo2 Accordingly, the
Act permits franchising authorities to require that channels be set
aside for public access and that cable operators provide funding,
staffing, and hardware for the production of access programming, and prohibits the cable operator from exerting any editorial control over the access programming. \03 The operator is
permitted to present its own programming on unused access
channels. \04
Under the current legislative scheme, access use has grown.
More than 1,200 cable systems run access programming and approximately 10,000 hours of access programming are produced
each week. \05 The development of access has been hampered,
though, by the failure of the Cable Act to protect it from assault,
hostility and neglect by certain members of both the cable industry and city government.
Almost 8,000 cable systems do not provide access for members of their community. In some communities this is due to the
limited capacity of outdated 12-channel systems, \06 but elsewhere the absence is due to lack of local governmental initiative.
Because the concept of access programming is still relatively
new, there is not a constituency demanding access in every town.
The revised Cable Act should permit all Americans to communicate electronically with their neighbors. Every cable system that
uses public rights-of-way. should be required to provide access
for members' of the local community. If that access is not used,
the "fallow time" provisions will permit the operator to present
programming. But that choice should only be made after the
101

/d. at § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (emphasis added).

934, supra note 12, at 30.
Cable Act, § 611(a), (b): and (e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(a), (b), and (e).
\04 [d. at § 6l1(d), § 531(d). This is known as the "fallow time" provision.
105 Kierman, To Watch is O.K., BtU to Air is Divine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct.
16, 1989, at 112.
\06 Since more than half of the nation's approximately 9,000 cable systems have at
least 30 channels, this excuse is no longer the primary source of the problem. Oversight
of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 339 (statement of FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes).
\02 HOUSE REPORT

103
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community has had the opportunity to learn of and experience
"the video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic
parallel to the printed leaflet." 107
To flourish, access must be adequately funded and available
for all to view. Most of the "funding" for access comes from the
sweat equity of the volunteer, but a minimum of equipment and
services for community use is needed to permit individuals and
small groups to learn how to produce access progTamming. In
times of budget crunches, money raised from the franchise fee
will be used for police forces and potholes, not access.108 In
many communities, access will be crippled if local g'overnment is
forced to make such a choice.
Cities should not be put in the situation of making this painful choice. Unlike franchise fees that represent "rent" for use of
city streets,109 money for access represents a legitimate, directly
relevant, regulatory purpose - ensuring that the cable system
that occupies the public property is available for communication
by the public. IIO Accordingly, the revised Cable Act should provide that money for access not be deducted from the franchise
fee ceiling.
Access uniquely permits electronic communication by "poor
and wealthy alike," and reduces concern of "domination of the
media by the wealthy." III Yet access programming cannot reach
those who cannot afford the unregulated rates of the cable operator. There can be no "effective competition" for public access
when no other forum for electronic communication is available.
Therefore, communities should be permitted to regulate the
rates charged for the least expensive tier containing access channels. This lifeline rate will permit a community to create an electronic village instead of an information underclass.
Finally, an important silence in the Cable Act should be addressed. Many public access centers are run neither by City Hall
107 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note·12,·at 30. The House Report noted that access can,
"also contribute to an informed citizenry by bringing local schools into the home, and
by showing the public local government at work." /d.
108 The Cable Act limits franchise fees to 5% of gross revenue per 12 month period.
Cable Act, § 622(b), 47 U.S.C. § 542(b).
109 See, e.g., Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988).
I 10 This is analogous to the requirement that newspapers pay a lict:nse fee for the
right to place news racks in a public train station. The court, in upholding this fee,
stressed that it was not a tax for filling the general coffers, but was to be used to provide
economical commuter transportation, in other words a directly related regulatory purpose. Gannet Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
III HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 36.

252

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 8:233

nor the cable operator, but by independent non-profit organizations.112 Access corporations, though not mentioned in the
Cable Act, are increasingly being used to run access channels. I 13
They facilitate the creation of broad community programming
without undue political and economic pressure. The Cable Act
provides that cable operators who do not edit or produce access
programming will not be liable for its content. 114 This makes
good sense; only the programmer who produces the program
should be responsible for its legal consequences. 115 The statutory language should be clarified so that the protection from liability extends to any entity be it city, independent access
organization or some alternate form of management that operates the access channel, yet is forbidden to exercise editorial
control. 116
Leased access has not been as fortunate as public access.
The inadequacies of the Cable Act have not simply hindered, but
have smothered, the ability of non-affiliated programmers to
reach the public through a system of leased access. 117 Although
the Cable Act requires that cable operators with more than thirtysix channels provide leased access at prices, terms and conditions
that are "reasonable," I 18 a reviewing court may not consider the
arrangement between a cable operator and its affiliate programmers in determining what is "Jeasonable."119 Thus, cable opera112 See, e.g., Taylor & Brand, Access: The Community Connection, reprinted in CABLE TV
RENEWALS & REFRANCHISING 82 O. Rice, ed. 1983) (describing an Access Management
Corporation as one, "set up by city ordinance to handle access. It is granted a portion of
the franchise fee, and its operation and relationship with both the city and the cable
operator is established by city ordinance."). Numerous cities including Boston, Massachusetts, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Austin, Texas have such independent entities running
access.
.
113 See, e.g., FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITY SERVICE CABLE TELEVISION, COMMUNITY
CHANNELS, FREE SPEECH & THE LAw II (1988).
114 Cable Act, § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
115 See, e.g., Cable Act, § 637, 47 U.S.C. § 557 (two years imprisol)ment and $10,000'
fine for anyone cablecasting obscene programming).
I 16 While a legal argument can be made that such protection is available through
either the Cable Act or the Constitution, the cloud of uncertainty that pervades this area
should be removed. See Meyerson, The Right to Speak, The Right to Hear, and the Right Not
to Hear: The Technological Resolution to the Cable/ Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH.]. L. REF.
137 (1988). See also Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 323 (statement of Sharon Ingraham, National Federation of Cable Programmers) (resident of Cincinnati, Ohio sues
both city and access center over the content of access programming, though neither
entity was permitted to exert editorial control).
I 17 One of the very few instances of use of leased access was in Pu'erto Rico, where a
cable company agreed to carry a former programmer, the Playboy Channel, as a "commercial use" channel, to avoid pro'secution for "obscenity." Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Public Servo Comm'n of Puerto Rico, 698 F. Supp. 401 (D.P.R. 1988).
118 Cable Act, § 612(c), (d), 47 U.S.C. § 532(c), (d). See generally Oversight of Cable TV,
supra note 6, at 395-97 (statement of Preston R. Padden).
119 Cable Act, § 611(d), 47 U.S.C. § 531(d).
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tors have been permitted to favor their own programmers at the
expense of the unaffiliated programmers.
The theory behind leased access voiced in 1984 is still valid:
Third-party commercial access complements [public] access by assuring that sufficient channels are available for commercial program suppliers with program services which
compete with existing cable offerings, 'or which are otherwise
not offered by the cable operator (for political reasons, for
instance) ....
. . . A requirement that channels be set aside for thirdparty commercial access separates editorial control over a limited number of cable channels from the ownership of the cable
system itself. Such a requirement is fundamental to the goal ofproviding subscribers with the diversity of information sources intended by the
First Amendment. 120
To make this "fundamental" requirement meaningful, several
changes must be implemented in the commercial use section. First,
unaffiliated programmers must be entitled to access to a cable system at rates, terms and conditions that are at least a.s favorable as
those provided to affiliated programming services. Second, there
must be a quick and inexpensive means for a programmer to learn
what rates will be charged. Thus, either franchising authorities or
state Public Service Commissions should be permiw::d to establish
rates, terms, and conditions for commercial access. Finally, the FCC
has stated that a cable system that has not been "deliberately configured" to technically preclude commercial access is not required
to share its hardware and facilities, even if they are necessary for the
operation of commercial access. 121 The Cable Act should be revised
so that cable operators have an affirmative duty to share all facilities
and services that are necessary for the growth and viability of leased
access.
Because the Cable Act was primarily negotiated by cities and
cable operators, another issue that received virtually no attention
was channel positioning. The Cable Act permitted cable operators
to determine the channel position for the programming it offered. 122 The theory was that, as at least a partial first amendment
934, supra note 12, at 30-31 (emphasis added).
Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 18,637, 18,642 (1985). The FCC made this statement despite being currently
barred from rulemaking in the area of commercial access. Cable Act, § 612(g), 47
U.S.C. § 532(g).
122 Cable Act, § 624(g), 47 U.S.C. § 544(g).
120 HOUSE REPORT

121
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speaker that selected programming services, cable operators should
be free to determine where these services would be displayed.
The deficiency in this reasoning is that the unrestrained power
to determine channel position has trampled first amendment rights
of other speakers, namely local broadcasters and public access programmers. Broadcast stations and access channels have been
moved away from the channel locations where they were known to
viewers and to high-number positions with inferior reception. 123
Significantly, giving the power to reposition access channels to a
cable operator does not further first amendment principles because
cable operators are not "speakers" for access channels but merely
serve as "conduits."124 In other words, access channels are not
within operators' editorial interest and operators should not be permitted to obstruct the development of an audience for access
programming.
With the demise of the must-carry rules,125 cable operators
have had the freedom to select which broadcasters to carry. Even
without new must-carry rules, though, random repositioning by
cable operators harms the public interest. There is, without question, a public benefit from free, over-the-air television. Television
stations generally invest great sums of money to acquaint the public
with their channel numbers. Historically, some cable systems have
positioned broadcasters on channels different from their FCC-assigned number and the stations have been forced to advertise both
numbers. In either case, it will obviously injure broadcasters to pay
the enormous added expense of reeducating the public to a new
channel position. If there is more than one cable system carrying a
local broadcast station, each can put the station at a different channel position, further harming the ability of that broadcaster to communicate with its audience. Random repositioning poses an
obvious threat to the well-being of local broadcasters, especially
smaller UHF stations. If local broadcast channels are, even to a
small extent competitors with cable television,126 it makes no sense
to put the power to hinder the effectiveness of the broadcasters in
the hands of their competitor. 127
123 See, e.g., Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 381-96 (statement of Preston R.
Padden).
124 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 35.
125 See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
126 Or, in the view of the FCC, "effective competition" for cable operators.lmplementation of the Provisions, 50 Fed. Reg. at 18,648-18,651.
127 See, e.g., Ziegler, United Cable Eyes Plan to Bump Network Ajjils to Upper Channels; TCI
Unit Will Cluster Independents, Multichannel News, Nov. 3, 1986, at I, cols. 1-3.
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The Cable Act should be revised to deny cable operators such
power. The position of access channels should be set by the
franchising authority. The channel position of local broadcasters
should be, where possible, that set by the numbering selected by the
FCC, except that when a broadcaster has had a different position on
a cable system for a significant period of time, the broadcaster
should have the choice of staying at that number or moving to the
one assigned by the FCC.
IV. CONCLUSION
When Congress drafted the Cable Act in 1984, it was not
writing on a blank slate, but over a confusing hodgepodge of
contradictory policies and conflicting jurisdictions. In revising
the Cable Act, Congress will have an easier task, since the framework is already in place and because experience under the Cable
Act has so blatantly revealed its weaknesses.
Care must nonetheless be taken to avoid repeating the errors of the past. All voices must be heard in the debate on revision. The public interest cannot be served if only the most
powerful interests are considered. Second, the sources of power
must· be more carefully delineated. A Federal Communications
Commission bent on deregulation can prevent localities from
performing the tasks assigned them by Congress. The preemption powe.rs of the FCC over cable must be precisely detailed.
Finally, the confusing world of cable legislation does not
need the further confusion of imprecise language. Not only must
policy considerations be carefully considered, but the language
chosen to express policy determinations must be painstakingly
evaluated. Key words and phrases must be defined so that their
meaning will be understood. In creating a new legal universe to
ensure efficient cable communications, Congress must ensure
that the new legal rules are efficiently communicated as well. In
drafting a revised Cable Act, "[t]he draftsman's job is to avoid
legal uncertainty, not to create it."128
128

LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING,

supra note 10, at 29.

